Air Force Institute of Technology

AFIT Scholar
Faculty Publications
12-14-2021

Developing a Resilient, Robust and Efficient Supply Network in
Africa
Jade F. Preston
Bruce A. Cox
Air Force Institute of Technology

Paul P. Rebeiz
o9 Solutions Inc.

Timothy W. Breitbach
Air Force Institute of Technology

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/facpub
Part of the Operations and Supply Chain Management Commons

Recommended Citation
Preston, J. F., Cox, B. A., Rebeiz, P. P., & Breitbach, T. W. (2021). Developing a resilient, robust and efficient
supply network in Africa. Journal of Defense Analytics and Logistics, 5(2), 224–241. https://doi.org/
10.1108/JDAL-09-2021-0006

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact
richard.mansfield@afit.edu.

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
https://www.emerald.com/insight/2399-6439.htm

JDAL
5,2

Developing a resilient, robust and
efficient supply network in Africa
Jade F. Preston and Bruce A. Cox

224

Department of Operational Sciences, Air Force Institute of Technology,
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, USA

Paul P. Rebeiz

Received 20 September 2021
Revised 26 October 2021
Accepted 26 October 2021

o9 Solutions Inc., Dallas, Texas, USA, and

Timothy W. Breitbach
Department of Operational Sciences, Air Force Institute of Technology,
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, USA
Abstract
Purpose – Supply chains need to balance competing objectives; in addition to efficiency, supply chains
need to be resilient to adversarial and environmental interference and robust to uncertainties in long-term
demand. Significant research has been conducted designing efficient supply chains and recent research has
focused on resilient supply chain design. However, the integration of resilient and robust supply chain
design is less well studied. The purpose of the paper is to include resilience and robustness into supply chain
design.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper develops a method to include resilience and robustness into
supply chain design. Using the region of West Africa, which is plagued with persisting logistical issues, the
authors develop a regional risk assessment framework and then apply categorical risk to the countries of West
Africa using publicly available data. A scenario reduction technique is used to focus on the highest risk
scenarios for the model to be tractable. Next, the authors develop a mathematical model leveraging this
framework to design a resilient supply network that minimizes cost while ensuring the network functions
following a disruption. Finally, the authors examine the network’s robustness to demand uncertainty via
several plausible emergency scenarios.
Findings – The authors provide optimal sets of transshipment hubs with varying counts from 5 through 15
hubs. The authors determine there is no feasible solution that uses only five transshipment hubs. The authors’
findings reinforce those seven transshipment hubs – the solution currently employed in West Africa – is the
cheapest architecture to achieve resilience and robustness. Additionally, for each set of feasibility
transshipment hubs, the authors provide connections between hubs and demand spokes.
Originality/value – While, at the time of this research, three other manuscripts incorporated both resilience
and robustness of the authors’ research unique solved the problem as a network flow instead of as a set
covering problem. Additionally, the authors establish a novel risk framework to guide the required amount of
redundancy, and finally the out research proposes a scenario reduction heuristic to allow tractable exploration
of 512 possible demand scenarios.
Keywords Network optimization, Supply chain design, Resilient networks, Robust networks, Scenario
analysis
Paper type Research paper
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1. Introduction
The Ebola outbreak and the rise of terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram and the
Islamic State in Africa have given Western Africa a recent place of prominence on the global
stage. In conjunction with this rise in global awareness, multiple agencies across the USA
Government – from the Department of Defense to the Center for Disease Control and
Department of State – have increased their presence in the region. Western Africa,
encompassing 18 countries roughly the size of the continental USA, has become the region in
Africa of highest logistical concern for the USA Government. With this increased presence
comes a critical need for reliable logistics support.
A key challenge facing the USA, the international community and commercial companies
establishing operations in Africa – especially Western Africa given the number of countries,
their expansiveness and the infrastructure condition – is the development of a robust,
resilient and efficient supply chain network (SCN). Adding to the complexity of this issue is
the fact that demand densities across the region are low and highly variable. Historically, the
USA Government supported humanitarian, military or other operations through the use of ad
hoc and contingency-scheduled air mobility missions. However, this has become costly and
unreliable. The absence of an efficient, resilient and robust aerial distribution system hinders
the USA and international community’s ability to respond to humanitarian crises and help
local governments combat terrorism.
In this paper, we examine a hub and spoke distribution network currently in use by the
USA Government in which mixed commodities of material, originating in the USA or Europe,
flow into a main hub on the West African coast. In addition to the main hub, there are
currently 6 transshipment nodes spread throughout the region that support up to 54
additional potential demand locations. We allow for a multi-modal distribution network in
which products can be transported by air, ground or water, but the primary mode remains air
due to large distances and difficult terrain. Low concentrations of USA and allied personnel in
the region result in low-demand levels with a high variability and occasional demand spikes
due to regional events.
This manuscript’s primary contributions are as follows: First, we propose a risk analysis
framework that codifies the risk of supply chain disruptions associated with the region’s
environmental challenges, natural barriers and internal conflicts. We employ a scenario
reduction technique to design the network in accordance with the highest-risk scenarios. We
then use the outcome of this risk framework to parameterize a two-stage stochastic
optimization network flow model. The resulting network is both resilient to disruption and
robust to uncertain future demand. To our knowledge, this is the first time a decision-analysis
framework is used in conjunction with the development of a resilient and robust supply chain
design.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review of SCNs design
and codifies meanings for disruptions, resilience and robustness in the context of graph theory.
Section 3 outlines the risk analysis framework and the underlying mathematical model
parameters, inputs and formulation. Section 4 outlines the disruption scenarios and model
variations considered, and then it analyzes several model instantiations. Section 5
summarizes research findings and recommendations. Section 6 concludes by summarizing
our research and providing future research directions.
2. Resilient, robust and efficient supply chain network designs
Developing a supply chain for West Africa is a SCN design problem, which is a subset of the
facility location problem [See, for instance, Mirchandani and Francis (1990) and Daskin (2011)
for excellent treatments of the facility location problem]. Specifically, the SCN design problem
models the supply chain as a network via graph theory (Wagner and Neshat, 2010). Nodes in
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the graph represent the locations of interest (i.e. suppliers, warehouses and or customers) and
the graph’s arcs represent the transportation routes between these locations.
2.1 Supply chain efficiency
Supply chain efficiency consists of attaining the supply chain’s goals with minimum
resources, thus achieving cost-related advantages (Borgstr€om, 2005). Efficiency is thus
naturally one of the dominant considerations in developing SCNs. Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996) showed that efficient networks are either complete graphs, star graphs or graphs with
no links. Heydari et al. (2015) showed that any two nodes in an efficient network have a
maximum distance of two connections between them. If this is not the case, the routes can be
restructured to obtain a network that achieves similar or better results.
Hub-and-spoke networks are a type of efficient networks. Under a hub-and-spoke
structure, demand locations (spokes) are all connected to warehouses (hubs). Yang et al. (2017)
discuss the efficiency of this type of design in which hubs are situated to minimize the
connection length between spokes. This corresponds to placing hubs in a centralized location,
which minimizes the number of hubs. As such, one can conclude that the transshipment nodelocation problem and the hub-and-spoke design problems both aim to achieve network
efficiency. Although efficient networks provide great benefit by reducing the number of
components while simultaneously satisfying demand, such networks pose notable
challenges.
Efficient networks are not always stable, and they are not always able to alter connections
without damaging function (i.e. be resilient to disruption) (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). In an
efficient network, removal of a link or of a node and its links could have serious ramifications,
potentially sabotaging any productivity gained by using an efficient network. This motivates
the consideration of network resilience. Mensah and Merkuryev (2014) and Sheffi and Rice
(2005) define resilience as the network’s capacity to return to its original state after disruption
or to mitigate disruption of network flow entirely. Hutchison and Sterbenz (2018) define
resilience as a network’s ability to maintain its service level during disruptions. However,
both of these definitions fail to explicitly define what is meant by a “disruption.” Indeed, Kim
et al. (2015) notes this exact problem and provides 16 different academic definitions for a
disruption.
2.2 Supply chain resilience
Berdica (2002) provides a seminal work linking transportation network vulnerability and
transportation network resilience. Specifically, they introduce resilience in terms of a
system’s dynamic stability. Tying the concepts of a disruptive event’s probability of
occurrence and consequence to system resilience, more recently, Mattsson and Jenelius (2015)
summarize the state of the art in research on transportation vulnerability and its linkage to
network resilience. Matisziw et al. (2009) also explore network resilience by exploring SCN
vulnerability through the simulation of disruptions. Similarly, Muckensturm and Longhorn
(2019) assess military theater distribution vulnerability via an NP-hard graph problem which
they solve heuristically.
Chowdhury and Quaddus (2017) define three dimensions for supply chain resilience as
follows: proactive, reactive and supply chain design quality. Proactive resilience relates to
design choices made a priori such as increasing capacity or redundancy. Reactive resilience
deals with the ability of a supply chain to recover from a disruption, and supply chain design
quality deals with node density, SCN complexity and node criticality. For the purposes of this
research, we utilize a graph-theoretic definition for resilience similar to that used by Kim et al.
(2015). Specifically, we state that a disruption is any action (natural or man-made) that
removes an arc or a node from the network. In the context of Chowdhury and Quaddus (2017),

our definition of resilience falls under both the proactive and supply chain design-quality
dimensions, as our resilience metric will motivate the creation of redundant supply
availability (i.e. multiple allocation Campbell (1996)). This is a rather binary definition, as in
the real world partial degradation is more likely, but it establishes a conservative design. We
thus define a node’s resilience as the number of arcs that can be removed from the network
before flow constraints prevent demand from being met at this node.
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) identify a tetrahedron as a stable network, as all links are
connected to one another. Thus, even with removal of an arc or node the network preserves
connectivity between the nodes. Clearly, then networks can become more resilient by
adding nodes or more arcs. Zhalechian et al. (2018) argue that adding resilience to their huband-spoke model could be achieved by connecting each node to multiple hubs. They
construct a fortified hub-and-spoke network, which resulted in a resilient network. This
network has built-in proactive and reactive capabilities, protecting it from natural
disasters, terrorist attacks and internal network problems. Ng et al. (2018) address networkrisk management by classifying nodes and arcs based on their geographic characteristics
and were able to mitigate the risk of network delays by assessing each node’s ease of access
and its suitability as a hub or spoke. Sadghiani et al. (2015) use a set-covering approach to
ensure demand locations are covered by multiple suppliers based on characteristics of the
demand locations in order to increase resilience. An et al. (2015) propose a reliable hub-andspoke network through the creation of hub backups and alternative flow routes. Similarly,
Rostami et al. (2018) ensure resilience through the assignment of backup hubs. However, as
compared with this paper, both Rostami and An et al. solve an assignment problem vs a
network flow. Reggiani et al. (2015) address transportation system resilience through the
lens of spatial complexity analysis, specifically through the concepts of connectivity and
accessibility. Such approaches focus on ensuring SCN resilience by adding routes and/or
nodes that preserve all locations’ ability to meet their demand. These network additions are
targeted at the location level. Such approaches are aligned with the technique we present in
section 3.
2.3 Supply chain robustness
Network robustness is an additional topic relevant to SCN design, which is often
confounded with resilience. Yang et al. (2017) point out that designing a network
corresponds to a long-term strategic decision under a dynamic and changing environment
and that due to variations in the network’s geospatial inputs, a robust network could be
required rather than an efficient network. Klibi et al. (2010) define robustness as “the quality
of a SCN to remain effective for all plausible futures.” In general, robustness is a network’s
ability to function “well” under a diverse set of potential future scenarios (Snyder et al.,
2006; Dong, 2006; Ben-Tal et al., 2009; Mulvey et al., 1995). We do not propose a concrete
definition for robustness, but strategically view the robustness of a SCN as its ability to
continue to meet demand under a wide ranging, but bounded, set of demand variations
including occasional demand spikes.
The topic of SCN robustness, while nascent compared to SCN resilience, has been studied
extensively in the last decade. Cardona-Valdes et al. (2011) present a seminal study examining
a two-echelon supply chain incorporating demand uncertainty. They solve this model
through the usage of a two-stage stochastic optimization model, where risk is modeled via
scenarios. More recently, Keyvanshokooh et al. (2016) modeled a stochastic supply chain
network design problem incorporating uncertainty in both cost and demand, and Kılıç and
Tuzkaya (2015) designed a SCN to maximize profit while handling demand uncertainty
through the use of a two-stage stochastic optimization model using scenarios. Such
approaches broadly mirror our own. However, the key difference is that our research
considers both robustness to demand uncertainties and resilience to disruptions.
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Figure 1.
Example hub-andspoke SCN with two
transshipment hubs in
blue and four demand
nodes in green. The
maximum number of
demand nodes each
transshipment node
can supply is three.
The demand Mi and
the required resilience
Ri are also provided for
each demand node

2.4 Resilience and robustness in tandem
To the best of our knowledge, only three other papers present approaches to design a SCN,
which is simultaneously resilient to disruption and incorporates scenario-based robust
optimization. Jabbarzadeh et al. (2016) design a SCN where facilities can be “hardened” to
reduce their potential for disruption. These hardened facilities supply lost demand from
unreliable facilities that have experienced a disruption. The researchers further study effects
of demand and supply fluctuations on the solution. In order to solve this problem,
Jabbarzadeh et al. use a hybrid robust-stochastic optimization model, which they solve using
a Lagrangian relaxation. In comparison, we do not examine resilience through hardening
nodes but rather by establishing redundant routes. Sadghiani et al. (2015) examine resilience
through a set-covering framework, where each demand node requires redundancy of supply.
Robustness is integrated through the consideration of numerous scenarios. This approach is
similar to our own, as we also utilize redundancy to handle resilience and multiple scenarios
to handle robustness. The key differences which make our research unique are that our
problem is solved as a network flow instead of as a set-covering problem and we establish a
risk framework to guide the required amount of redundancy. Zhalechian et al. (2018) design a
SCN using several resilience approaches, including design complexity and multiple
allocations. They solve this problem using a two-stage stochastic optimization model,
where the scenarios have been chosen using a scenario reduction technique. Our approach is
broadly aligned with that proposed by Zhalechian, but we differ in that as we propose a riskanalysis framework for establishing constraints on the required resilience by node, and we
focus more pragmatically on solving for a real world SCN.
3. Risk analysis and model formulation
In Figure 1, we provide a small-scale SCN example. Ri represents the required resilience for
each demand node i; equivalently, the number of supply nodes required to ensure that
demand node i has an acceptable level of risk associated with its demand not being met due to
supply disruptions. The required resilience Ri could be determined for each demand node i
through numerous decision-analysis frameworks. We provide a framework based on demand
node location focused on conflict, infrastructure and climate risks. A resilience requirement
score Ri 5 1 indicates an extremely stable location with solid infrastructure and temperate
climate presenting a low risk of supply disruption. Nodes with a resilience requirement score
of Ri 5 2 indicate locations with increased risk either due to conflict, infrastructure and
climate or some combination thereof for which a single redundant supply node is deemed
necessary to ensure the risk of supply disruptions is controlled. Higher Ri values then 2 are
also possible, each representing an increased level of required resilience in order to control
risk of supply disruption.
The importance of demand robustness can also be visualized in Figure 1. Consider that the
normal demand pattern represented below is perturbed such that M4 5 5 changes to M4 5 10.
This could be due to increased humanitarian operations (e.g. Ebola) in the local area. The

SCN, as depicted, could struggle to respond to such a change, since the entirety of the change
in demand would be borne by the transshipment node on the right. Conversely, if the normal
demand pattern represented above is perturbed such that M3 5 5 changes to M3 5 10, the
SCN may be able to more efficiently respond, as both transshipment nodes could contribute to
fulfilling the demand change.
The supply chain in Western Africa is currently an efficient hub and spoke network.
However, the focus on efficiency inhibits the network’s ability to function in emergency or
disaster situations (lack of resilience), as well as hinders its ability to function well under
diverse scenarios with changed system parameters (lack of robustness). The ability to
operate under both emergency and crisis situations is paramount in humanitarian and
military operations. The need for this logistics network will remain far into the future. Our
study considers design elements to ensure that both resilience and robustness are
incorporated into the network supporting West Africa. This research develops a
framework to identify and quantify risk in West Africa and then develops and optimizes a
mathematical model to find the best routes to ensure necessary network resilience, and
finally, this research uses stochastic analysis of plausible demand scenarios to ensure
network robustness.
To address the logistical challenges present in West Africa – large distances, poor
infrastructure, insecure routes, etc. – the supply chain was restructured to achieve a higherservice level and increased efficiency. The network operates under a hub-and-spoke design
with a main hub, 6 transshipment nodes and 54 other potential demand locations. Any of the
transshipment nodes, as well as the main hub, may also experience demand.
Table 1 shows the 16 West African countries that are included in the analysis, along with
the number of potential demand nodes within each country. The European hub serves as a
“dummy node,” where supplies originate and ship to the main hub. The main hub of entry into
West Africa and the other six transshipment locations were determined by decision-makers
prior to the undertaking of this study. We seek to assess and increase the network’s resilience
by changing the transshipment hubs and adding backup links between these hubs and end
demand nodes. A key difference in our approach is that we examine resilience from the
perspective of link availability. This is a fundamentally different approach to prior resilience
research that primarily focuses on node availability. We posit that link availability is the

Country
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Number of nodes

Benin
1
Burkina Faso*
8
Cameroon*
5
Chad
4
Ivory Coast
1
Gabon
1
Ghana
4
Liberia
1
Mali
8
Mauritania
4
Central African Republic
1
Niger*
10
Nigeria
8
Senegal*
3
Sierra Leone
1
Togo
1
Note(s): Countries identified as having transshipment nodes in original architecture are indicated with a “*”

Table 1.
Supply chain consists
of 61 total demand
locations
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primary concern for distribution systems in highly uncertain environments, such as West
Africa, where large distances and risky areas must be traversed. Focusing on link availability
enables a country-wide viewpoint for risk assessment and recognizes that over large
distances, the links are much more vulnerable than the nodes.
3.1 Risk framework
The network configuration as first established does not implement any backup routes for
material flow, possibly leaving nodes unsupported where an upstream hub, or route,
disruption could occur. Though the existing air routes are flexible by nature, because of the
long distances between locations and delays inherent to country clearance and border issues,
a relatively fixed-delivery schedule has been implemented. Therefore, a transshipment node
disruption would leave its supported nodes vulnerable for some time. The primary goal of
this research is to identify an optimal variant of the network that adds resilience to disruption
while maintaining efficiency and adding robustness to demand changes. Toward that end,
our model requires each location be connected to more than one transshipment node.
However, determining “appropriate” levels of redundancy is non-trivial, as these decisions
necessitate a risk analysis framework and implementation – our first major contribution. We
focus our risk analysis on three areas of interest for every country: internal conflict,
infrastructure and terrain/climate.
Table 2 gives a short description of these three categories, along with the available scores
and the meaning of each score by category. Classifications for conflict are determined by the
U.S. Department of State Travel Advisory, and classifications for infrastructure are
determined by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Fact Book (Central Intelligence
Agency, 2018; U.S Department of State-Bureau of Consular affairs, 2018). Classification for
terrain/climate was accomplished by the research team, thus presenting one subjective view.
However, the classifications could be adjusted based on subject matter expertise or changing
contextual conditions. Our unique approach incorporates the risk framework into the SCN
design, establishing the value of the parameter Ri, which is used in our optimization model to
generate a proposed resilient, robust and efficient supply chain for Western Africa.
Table 3 presents the results for each country. To determine aggregated risk, we place
equal weight on each of three criteria and sum the individual scores to assess an overall
(aggregated) risk score for each country. Such a framework does not preclude the application
of non-equal weights if a subject matter expert determines one of the three categories to be
more or less significant than the others.
Lastly, we compute a required resilience level, Ri, for each location i, which is based on the
aggregated-risk score for that location’s country. For the purposes of this research, the

Description
Table 2.
Resilience risk analysis Score
framework:
Description and scores
for three considered
categories of internal
conflict, infrastructure
and terrain/climate

Internal disputes and
drug and human
trafficking
0
1
2

Terrain/
Climate

Conflict

Infrastructure

Air, land, and sea
capabilities

Disruptions relating to
natural phenomena

Exercise normal
precaution when
traveling
Exercise increased
caution when traveling
Do not travel/
reconsider travel

Ranked in Top 3rd in
World Fact Book

No issues

Ranked in Middle 3rd in
World Fact Book
Ranked in bottom 3rd in
World Fact Book

Mild issues
Severe
issues

following step function was used to assign required resilience levels Ri based on the
calculated aggregated risk. As noted in the description of Figure 1 lower Ri scores indicate
more stable geographical, geopolitical and climatic conditions requiring fewer backup supply
arcs, while higher Ri scores indicate increasingly less-stable regions requiring higher
numbers of backup arcs to mitigate risks.
8
if Aggregated Risk ¼ 0 or 1
<2
Ri ¼ 3
if Aggregated Risk ¼ 2 or 3
(1)
:
4
if Aggregated Risk ≥ 4

Developing a
resilient, robust
supply chain

231

3.2 Mathematical formulation
We developed an explicit mathematical formulation of the distribution network in West
Africa as a two-staged stochastic, mixed-integer linear program in order to determine the
optimal location for transshipment locations and route connections. The first stage
determines transshipment node locations and the connections to demand nodes. The second
stage solves the network flow problem, routing demand from transshipment nodes to
demand nodes with the dual goals of minimizing transportation cost and maximizing
resilience. Robustness to demand perturbations is informed by various subject matter
experts and historically-informed acute emergency scenarios. To provide a precise statement
of this problem, we define as follows:
Sets:
I
M
S
K(i,j)

Set of nodes, i ∈ I 5 {1, . . . , 61}
Set of transportation modes, m ∈ M 5 {1 5 air, 2 5 land, 3 5 sea}
Set of scenarios, s ∈ S 5 {1, . . . ,10}
Set of available transportation modes between location i and location j. K(i,j) ∈ M

Score

Aggregated
risk

Ri

0
0
2

2
3
4

3
3
4

1

0

3

3

2
0
0
1

1
1
0
0

0
0
0
1

3
1
0
2

Liberia
Mali
Mauritania
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone

0
2
2
2
2
0
1

0
1
1
1
0
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
1

0
3
3
3
2
1
3

Togo

1

1

0

2

Table 3.
3
2 Resilience risk analysis
by country: Explicit
2
risk scores are first
3
assigned to each
country by category,
2
scores are then
3 summed to calculate an
3 aggregated risk metric,
3 and finally, a resilience
3 metric Ri is assigned to
2 each country based on
3
its aggregated risk
according to
3
equation (1)

Country

Conflict

Infrastructure

Benin
Burkina Faso
Cameroon

0
2
1

2
1
1

Central African
Republic
Chad
Gabon
Ghana
Ivory Coast

2

Terrain/Climate
Description

Volcano in W. Africa with
fatal levels of gas

Possible torrential flooding
during rainy season

Rainfall makes it one of the
wettest W. African coasts
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Parameters:
Um 5
Tm
i;j 5
BigM 5
V5
Ri 5
Ci 5
Gi 5
Di,s 5
Qm
i;j 5
Ps 5

Hourly operating cost of transportation mode m
Travel time from location i to location j using transportation mode m
A large number, which is used for logical modeling
Number of transshipment node connections
Required resilience at location i, and explicitly, the number of connections required at
location i
Maximum number of connections established at location i
Fixed cost of establishing a hub at location i
Location i demand under scenario s
Cost for establishing a connection between location i and location j for transportation
mode m
Probability of scenario s

Decision variables:
xi 5
ym
i;j 5
wm;s
i;j 5
zki;j 5

Binary variable; equals 1 if transshipment node i is open and 0 otherwise.
Binary variable; equals 1 if a connection is established between transshipment location i
and location j using transportation mode m and 0 otherwise.
Binary variable; equals 1 if established connection ym
i;j is used under scenario s and
0 otherwise.
Quantity (short tons (STONS)) shipped from location i to location j using connection wm;s
i;j

The network allows material to be delivered using three methods of transportation as
follows: air, land and sea. Our underlying network is assumed fully connected for air and land
transport modes, while sea connections exist between all nodes located on the coasts, with
travel times between two nodes calculated as follows: for any two locations i,j ∈ I, we compute
the estimated travel time T m
i;j for transportation mode m based on the distance between two
nodes and the average speed of the mode. If a transportation mode is infeasible between two
locations, that specified route receives an input of BigM, ensuring the model does not select an
infeasible route. Since a core tenant of the network is a single point of entry from Europe, the
initial version of the model established as infeasible all other routes to West Africa.
Travel time by air was calculated with the Euclidean distance formula using each
location’s latitude and longitude coordinates as determined by Google Earth. Distances were
then multiplied by the average speed of 335 miles per hour (mph) – the average speed of an
L100 – which is the primary cargo aircraft currently in use in the region. Only pairs of
locations with airports and runways within 20 miles of each endpoint had calculated air
distances. Shared airports between two locations were precluded. Ownership of an airport
was determined by closest distance. As this model is predominately interested in minimizing
cost and unmet demand vs minimizing time, loading/unloading times were not included.
Ground transport times between locations were estimated using the recommended path
from Google Maps and were only assigned if the route linking the pair of locations could be
traversed by land vehicles. Due to poor road quality and traffic, the planning factor currently
in use is 25 mph. Specifically, land transportation was deemed unsuitable if another form of
transportation was also required, e.g. both ferry and ground transportation.
Finally, sea transportation times were calculated using the website, Sea-Distance.org,
which provides nautical miles between ports (sea-distances.org, 2019). For consistency, the
calculated nautical miles were then converted to miles. Sea distances were only computed for
pairs of locations with sea ports at each endpoint. The estimated sea transport speed is 28
mph. We assume that there is no capacity limit for each mode of transportation. While any

individual aircraft has capacity limits, we assume that sufficient transport vehicles exist to
meet cargo demand by any modality; an assumption in line with the relatively sparse demand
patterns experienced in the region.
The problem of transshipment node selection, network connections establishment, mode
choice and inventory distribution is formulated by the mixed integer linear program as
follows, which we call the African Supply Chain Network Problem (ASCNP):
X
XX X m
XXX X m
Gi xi þ
Qi;j ym
þ
T i;j Um Ps wm;s
min
i;j
i;j
(2)
w;x;y;z
i∈I

i∈I j∈I m∈Kði;jÞ

s:t:

s∈S i∈I j∈I m∈Kði;jÞ

X
i∈I

xi ¼ V ;

∀i; j ∈ I ; i ≠ j;

ym
i;j <¼ xi

XX
ym
i;j >¼ Rj

(3)

∀m ∈ M ;

∀j ∈ I ;

(5)

m i;i≠j

XX

∀i ∈ I ;

ym
i;j <¼ Ci xi

(6)

m j;j≠i

m
wm;s
i;j <¼ yi;j

∀i; j ∈ I ; i ≠ j;

m;s
zm;s
i;j <¼ BigMwi;j

∀m ∈ M ;

∀i; j ∈ I ; i ≠ j

XX m;s XX m;s
zj;i 
zi;j >¼ Di;s
m j;j≠i

m j;j≠i

∀s ∈ S;

∀m ∈ M ;

∀i ∈ I ;

(4)

∀s ∈ S:

(7)

(8)

(9)

ASCNP is structured as a two-stage, multi-objective optimization problem. The first stage
seeks to minimize hub and link establishment and the expected transportation cost. The
second stage seeks to maximize network resilience by minimizing complexity, criticality,
density and expected unmet demand. The first term in the objective function (2) is the
investment costs for establishing transshipment nodes. This represents the cost for
establishing the capability of a node to serve as an air, land or sea transshipment point. The
cost would include both physical infrastructure and administrative support. The second term
in the objective function is the investment costs for establishing links between the nodes. The
link costs are mode specific and would also include infrastructure, equipment and
administrative functions. The third term in the objective function is the expected
operational costs. These costs are a function of serving demand and are determined by the
travel time between two nodes, given the mode that is selected and the cost of that mode.
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While travel time is an imperfect metric, attributing accurate costs for land, air and sea
shipments was beyond scope of this research, so transit time multiplied by mode cost per
hour is used as a cost proxy.
Constraint (3) sets the required number of transshipment nodes. There are seven
transshipment nodes (the main hub plus six extant transshipment hubs) in the base model in
accordance with the real world. This number is varied during succeeding model runs.
Constraint (4) ensures that a link can only be established between nodes i and j if a
transshipment node is established at i. Constraint (5) specifies the number of transshipment
node connections, Rj, which a location j requires. This ensures network resilience is
commensurate with location risk and is determined according to the methodology in section
3.1. Constraint (6) imposes an upper bound, C, on the number of outbound connections a
transshipment node can support (xi 5 1). Our initial assumption is that all transshipment
nodes can support the same number of locations, but we cap the total number of locations that
a transshipment node can support at 30 and thus C 5 30 for our base case. Constraint (7)
ensures that no material can flow between locations i and j under scenario s unless a
connection is established between them. Constraint (8) imposes an upper bound on the
quantity of material sent between i and j using mode m. Constraint (9) represents the flow
constraint at location i and ensures that the net flow of material to a location meets its demand
(i.e. total flow of material delivered to a location minus total flow of material shipped out from
that location is, at least, equal to its demand, Di,s). As a result, locations can accumulate excess
material, which is an occurrence not atypical of real world instances of warehouses having a
surplus of material to insulate network from demand spikes.

4. Scenario-based robustness analysis
The goal of this research is to design a resilient and robust network for West Africa to cover
61 potential demand locations. Resilience to potential network disruptions is handled in the
ASCNP model via the Ri parameter as informed by the risk assessment framework developed
in section 3.1. The resilience of the resulting network is ensured by requiring that each
location be serviced by a calculated number of transshipment facilities. Locations with higher
risk of disruption due to conflict, infrastructure or terrain have higher-connection
requirements. Hence, in the event of a network disruption, a previously identified and
established backup route could be activated, preventing demand shortages. Identifying
backup routes early ensures that contracts and contingency plans can be enacted.
The establishment of new transshipment hubs and backup routes will have an associated
cost. Hub setup costs are selected by random draw from U(100, 400) (thousands US$).
Recognizing that transportation modes will have different infrastructure and support
requirements, link setup costs are also selected by random draw from air: U(20, 40), land:
U(5, 10) and sea: U(15, 30).
However, network disruptions are not the only risk that a supply network needs to be able
to handle. Scenario-based robustness analysis was used to assess how changing demand
signals and/or capacity restrictions resulted in changes in the network design. This was
accomplished by analyzing different demand scenarios and network modifications. These
demand scenarios and network modifications are presented below.
4.1 Scenarios considered
The West Africa logistics network is a low-demand, high-priority network. Its inherent low
demand induces a high-natural variability throughout the year as a result of a lack of
“smoothing.” Also, the region of West Africa is also prone to instability and emergency
situations both natural and man-made. Developing a supply chain that insulates against

these acute perturbations ensures military and governmental ability to respond to these
Developing a
emergencies. The following scenarios are based on history and subject matter expertise; resilient, robust
however, the probabilities and real-world demand distributions have been replaced with
supply chain
nominal values for operational security considerations. In order to preserve operational
security, all demand and risk data presented in this research have been sanitized. Real-world
data are available upon request to authorized agencies.
We assume that demand at each location is uniformly distributed, and we assign each
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node’s demand using a random draw from U(10, 50) (thousands STONS). Due to various
instability issues in West Africa, demand is prone to fluctuations. To account for this variation,
we incorporated three scenarios based on their historical occurrences: epidemic, terrorist attack
and internal conflict. For each of the scenarios, we associate a probability of occurrence as well
as the resulting percentage increase in demand to account for the heightened requirement for
food, medical supplies, equipment and personnel. Table 4 summarizes each demand scenario’s
affected countries, likelihood of occurring and percentage increase in demand.
As multiple crisis scenarios could occur simultaneously, there are eight possible combinations
of crises scenarios, including a “nothing happens” scenario. Using Bayes’ theorem, we can
determine the probabilities for all eight possible combinations of crisis. The resulting eight
possible crisis scenarios are detailed in Table 5. There are seven possible location scenarios (one 1country, three 2-country and three 3-country scenarios) for each event occurrence, and thus, 512
total (83) possible scenarios are there, including the no event occurrence scenario.
We assume that an event occurrence can affect all three countries with probability 0.4,
each of the three pairs of countries with probability 0.15 and each country with probability
0.05. Further, we assume that in case a country is affected by an event, all of its locations will
be affected as well. Using the epidemic event and its corresponding countries, namely Liberia,
Senegal and Sierra Leone as an example, we assign a probability of 0.4 in case all three
countries are affected, a probability of 0.15 for each of the country pairs (Liberia and Senegal),
(Liberia and Sierra Leone) and (Senegal and Sierra Leone) and a probability of 0.05 for each of
Liberia, Senegal and Sierra Leone. The same probability assignment scheme applies for the
events of terrorist attack and internal conflict. The risk probabilities could be easily changed
Table 4.
and the model re-run with inputs from subject matter experts. We chose higher probabilities Three non-independent
Epidemic
Likelihood
20%
Countries
Liberia, Senegal and Sierra
affected
Leone
Demand increase 300%
Source(s): www.cdc.gov (2017), Roby (2018)

Event notation
None
A
B
C
AB
AC
BC
ABC

Epidemic

Terrorist attack

Internal conflict

50%
Chad, Niger and
Nigeria
200%

80%
Burkina Faso, Mali and
Niger
100%

Terrorist attack

Internal conflict

U
U
U
U
U
U

U
U
U

U
U
U

crisis scenarios
considered for
robustness analysis
along with
probabilities of
occurrence, locations
effected and associated
increase in regional
demand to handle
crisis

Prob. Occurrence
8%
2%
8%
32%
2%
8%
32%
8%

Table 5.
Eight possible
combinations of the
three crisis scenarios
with associated
probability of
occurrence
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for multiple-country events under the assumption that there would be cross-border spillover
in the event of one of the occurrences.
The large number of scenarios makes the ASCNP computationally infeasible. As a result,
we employ a scenario-reduction technique to reduce the number of scenarios the model
considers. This technique consists of first-ranking scenario probabilities in descending order.
The top N scenarios are selected and then the probabilities of the selected scenarios are
normalized. Given the number of selected scenarios, the ASCNP model selects the
transshipment hubs, the demand nodes each transshipment hub supports (capped at 30)
as well as the transportation mode used on each link and backup links. The objective function
minimizes the cost of operating the network, given the possible scenarios. Accounting for
N 5 10 scenarios is computationally feasible and provides enough coverage of the design
space to ensure the highest-risk scenarios are accounted for. The top-ten scenarios as found
by our scenario reduction technique are shown in Table 6.
4.2 Number of hubs sensitivity analysis
In addition to the scenario-specific demand changes resulting from the crisis events described
above, we expand upon the base model by conducting sensitivity analysis on the number of
transshipment hubs in the network (Constraint 3). Because the number of hubs is a fixed
parameter, we recognize that the number chosen will have a substantial impact on both cost
and resilience. We run the model with 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 15 transshipment hubs. This set
brackets the real world situation of seven transshipment hubs as well as expands outward to
explore how several additional transshipment hubs would impact the SCN. The
establishment of hubs and links will take time and resources, but fewer hubs will result in
less-possible backup connections, i.e. less resilience. Therefore, varying the number of hubs
either validates the current network configuration or provides recommended modifications
for how the ASCNP could improve robustness and resilience at the lowest possible cost.
5. Findings and contributions
The AFSCN model selects transshipment hubs, assigns demand nodes to each transshipment
hub and establishes an optimal flow by transportation mode. Out of these tasks, arguably the
most interesting, to the decision-makers, is an examination of the recommended
transshipment nodes along with their aggregate demand connections. This information
enables the decision-makers to ensure they have both invested in the correct transshipment
hubs and have invested enough to right-size each transshipment hub. Table 7 shows the
Description

Internal conflict in all three countries
No events
Terrorist attack and internal conflict in all three countries
Internal conflict in Burkina Faso and Mali
Internal conflict in Burkina Faso and Niger
Internal conflict in Mali and Niger
Terrorist attack in all three countries
Terrorist attack in Chad and Niger
Plus internal conflicts in all three countries
Terrorist attack in Chad and Nigeria
Table 6.
The top-ten most likely Plus internal conflicts in all three countries
Terrorist attack in Niger and Nigeria
scenarios out of 512
Plus internal conflicts in all three countries
possible scenarios

Normalized probability
0.2599
0.1622
0.1039
0.0972
0.0972
0.0972
0.0650
0.0391
0.0391
0.0391

Transshipment hub location

5 hubs

Number of connections per transshipment hub
6 hubs
7 hubs
8 hubs
10 hubs

15 hubs
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Accra
–
30
28
27
23
18
Agadez
–
–
–
–
16
–
Apapa
–
–
30
21
–
14
Cotonou
–
–
–
–
–
11
Djibo
–
30
30
28
27
18
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Freetown
–
30
27
22
163
15
Kaduna
–
–
30
–
18
13
Kano
–
30
26
20
17
12
Lome
–
–
–
–
21
15
Maroua
–
30
–
30
23
17
Menaka
–
–
–
–
–
12
Mouhoun
–
–
–
–
–
3
Sokoto
–
–
–
24
–
11
Tessalit
–
–
–
–
–
3
Tichit
–
29
8
7
5
4
Timbuktu
–
–
–
–
13
8
Yearly cost (thousands US$)
–
371,072
370,936
370,992
371,176
371,685
Table 7.
Note(s): The numbers in table are a count of arcs out of each established transshipment node. “–” indicates Vertical axis is set of all
this transshipment node was not established for the case in question. Bottom row is yearly cost of operation and
experienced
set-up
transshipment hubs

recommended locations for each transshipment hub option and the number of connections for
each location. The total number of connections is the same across all architectures.
Given the demands and constraints for AFSCN, there is no feasible solution if we only allow
five transshipment hubs. Six transshipment hubs is feasible, but this architecture is actually
more expensive than when we allow seven transshipment hubs – the solution currently
employed in West Africa. Our recommended hubs are not the exact match as those in the actual
network, but they are geographically similar. There are two items of note as we move to eight or
more transshipment hubs. First, as we would expect in a hub and spoke network, the cost of
each solution increases with the number of hubs once a certain threshold is reached. After seven
transshipment hubs, the network cost is increased by the non-trivial cost of establishing
additional transshipment hubs. There is an optimal size from a cost perspective.
Second, there is a strong pattern that as the number of transshipment hubs is increased,
new transshipment hubs are added to the existing nodes. There are, however, important
exceptions. Eight transshipment hubs do not include Kaduna, which in the case of seven
transshipment hubs was maxed out at 30 connections. This follows traditional portfolio
optimization results in which an optimal portfolio using a subset of the total funds rarely is an
exact subset of the optimal portfolio using the full set of funds. However, in the context of
supply chain design, it is an issue we would bring to the decision-makers, as they may want to
develop a distribution network aimed at growing toward eight transshipment hubs, thus
selecting a sub-optimal design at six or seven transshipment hubs. Switching hubs may not
be a feasible option given the required investment costs.
In addition to suggesting the optimal set of transshipment hubs that meet resilience
requirements at the lowest possible cost, the model suggests connections between
transshipment hubs and down-range demand nodes. These results represent both primary
and backup connections that would need to be contractually established to ensure the
required resilience. Table 8 provides a sample of this output with 20 of the 61 demand nodes
for the 6 transshipment hub scenario. Similar tables were produced for all other scenarios.

Abeche
Abidjan
Abuja
Agadez
Aguelal
Apapa
Arlit
Atar
Bakel
Bamako
...
Tahoua
Tamale
Tapoa
Terna
Tessalit
Tichit
Timbuktu
Tombouctou
Yaounde
Zinder

0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
...
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0

1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
...
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1

Accra
LAND

Table 8.
Suggested connections
between
transshipment hubs
(top row), a
representative subset
of 20 of the 61 demand
sites (first column) and
A 1 in a cell indicates a
suggested connection
between a
transshipment hub and
a demand site by
modality

AIR
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
...
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0

AIR
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
...
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1

Dijbo
LAND
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
...
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

AIR
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
...
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0

Maroua
LAND
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
...
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0

AIR
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
...
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Tichit
LAND
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
...
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1

AIR

1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
...
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0

Kano
LAND

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
...
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0

1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
...
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0

Free town
AIR
LAND
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This research provides decision-makers insight into how both resilience and robustness
can be accounted for in real world networks. It also highlights the tradeoffs that managers
must be cognizant of when balancing cost against resilience and robustness. Given the total
number of primary and backup connections is held constant across the different hub
designs, a more decentralized network, i.e. more hubs, would indicate more resilience even
though the total number of connections are the same. This is the argument for choosing an
increased-hub design even though it may be more expensive. Or decision-makers have the
option of selecting the least expensive design that meets the resilience and robustness
requirements given the risk assessments. A key contribution is that the options are clearly
presented.
Academically, the main contribution of this paper is a method by which supply chain
designers and network planners can integrate risk assessments, local capabilities and
environmental factors into facility location decisions. We provide a risk analysis
framework that classifies levels of conflict, infrastructure capability and environmental
risk. These factors are generalizable across any facility location problem and are relevant to
all supply chains. We then show how publicly available data sets – provided by the U.S.
State Department and CIA Factbook – can be used to populate the risk framework with
location-specific assessments. We used a scenario-reduction technique to focus on the
highest-risk scenarios. The number of possible situations is extremely large in a real,
complex environment. This method highlights an approach to focus on those situations
that are highest risk, highest cost or any other area of focus that is deemed most critical. The
countries of West Africa and real-demand scenarios are used to demonstrate how these
factors are taken into account to design an efficient network that is both resilient to
disruption and robust to demand changes. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
such effort to do this.
6. Conclusion and future research
This research study created a resilient operational road map to allow a network to function
during disruptions. Our AFSCN model incorporates 61 West African demand locations and
suggests transshipment nodes by scenario. To account for demand fluctuations due to
disruption – terrorist attacks, epidemics and/or natural disaster – multiple different scenario
occurrences and their likelihood were identified. We then analyzed the resulting network
connections and shipping flow.
There is a cost to establish backup connections for resilience and robustness. Specifically,
such connections lead to solutions that use less efficient routes. In fact, when accounting for
the distances of connections to transshipment nodes, the model does not always choose the
cheapest shipping connection for a single connection but solves for the cheapest architecture
overall. Two key points emerge from this insight. First, there is an efficiency cost to resilience.
Modeling the network allows us to determine that cost, which can be captured as we saw in
Table 7. Second, resilience must be considered at the supply chain level and not the individual
node level. As our AFSCN model demonstrates, the optimal system design may lead to suboptimal solutions for individual nodes and routes.
This study opens several opportunities for future research. The number of items shipped
by air, land and sea is unconstrained. However, in real-world situations, different locations
have different capacity and means available, e.g. air crew sizes and number of land/sea
vehicles. A more realistic instance of this model would be to impose a limit on the quantity of
material that can shipped by each mode. Finally, robustness in this model is handled by
examining the highest likelihood scenarios through a two-stage stochastic optimization
problem. A more rigorous, and presently open question, would be to incorporate resilience
into a robust optimization framework.
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